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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of THOMAS DELANO, 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Respondent, 
Appearances : 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 0 1 -06-ST7260 Index No. 7550-06 
Thomas Delano 
Inmate No. 02-A-2779 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Camp Pharsalia Correctional Facility 
Route 23 
South Plymouth, NY 13 844 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Bridget E. Holohan, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
Thquthipn~r, an inmafa at Gomp Phomnlia Carrcutitlnal Facility, lrna ~ t ~ i n m c d  the 
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instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated Dccember 
20, 2005 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving a term of 
two and one half years to five years for conviction of the crime of burglary third degree. He 
was on parole supervision at the time he committed the crime. Among the many arguments 
set forth in the petition, petitioner contends that the Parole Board failed to consider his 
accomplishments while he has been incarcerated. He points out that he obtained a certificate 
in Phase I11 Transitional Services and completed the Alcoholics Anonymous and ASAT 
programs. He indicates that he completed the custodial maintenance program. He has 
worked over 200 hours in a community based work crew. He has annexed to his petition a 
number of letters of support. He indicates he has an excellent disciplinary record. Petitioner 
criticizes the Parole Board for not considering the factors under Executive Law 6 259-i. In 
his view the Parole Board improperly focused on the seriousness of the crime for which he 
is incarcerated and that the actions of the Board were tantamount to a re-sentencing. 
Petitioner maintains that the Parole Board violated his Due Process rights. He points out that 
he is above the puideline range (ses 9 NYCRR 800 1.3 [c]). He awxtq  that the Pamle Rnwd 
failed to provide a detailed explanation for its determination. Petitioner also contends that 
the determination was the result of an executive policy adopted by Governor Pataki to deny 
parole to violent felony offenders. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
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“Despite your receipt of an earned eligibility certificate, parole 
is denied for the following reasons: After a careful review of 
your record and your interview, it is the determination of this 
panel that, if released at this time, there is a reasonable 
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and your release at this time is incompatible 
with the welfare and safety of the community. The decision is 
based on the following factors: 
“Your instant offense of burglary third by plea continues an 
extensive history of criminal justice involvement dating to 1983 
and including approximately seven misdemeanor and nine 
felony convictions. Also noted are pad failures on community 
supervision. It is noted that you were on parole when you 
committed the instant crime. Your programming and 
disciplinary record since your last Board appearance have been 
considered. Discretionary release must again be denied due to 
your continuing criminal justice involvement, pattern of 
burglary-related criminality and negative response to past 
correctional influences. You are a career criminal who refuses 
to stop breaking the law and if released at this time, there is a 
reasonable probability that you will not remain at liberty without 
violating the law. 
“He is above the guidelines. Continuous involvement with the 
criminal justice system, pattern of similar offenses, negative 
response to past correctional influences.” 
As stated in Executive Law 8259-i (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be ?ranted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
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education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate []; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law 4259-i [2] [c] [A]). 
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189 
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (see Ristau v. 
Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality 
bordering on impropriety’’ on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate 
judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting 
Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence 
of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made 
by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294 
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
lhe Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
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factors as petitioner's institutional programming, his disciplinary record, his plans upon 
release, and support letters in his file. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the 
petitioner ofthe reasons for the denial ofparole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive 
Law $259-i (see Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of 
Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper 
and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate's crimes 
and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 
906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189 
AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as 
the inmate's criminal history (E Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; 
Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not 
required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining 
the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Farid v Travis, supra; 
Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter 
CfColladcr v New York-Ctate Divi+yofP_erdc, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3rd Dept., ?QOl]). Nor mist  
the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of 
Executive Law 5 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd 
Dept., 20061). In other words, "[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable 
weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a 
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner's criminal history, together with the other 
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statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
It is well settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility does not serve as a 
guarantee of release (see, People ex rel. Justice v Russi, 226 AD2d 82 1 [3rd Dept., 19961; 
Matter of Flecha v Russi, 22 1 AD2d 780 [3rd Dept., 19851; Matter of Walker v Russi, 176 
AD2d 1185 [3rd Dept., 19911 lv dismissed 79 NY2d 897). 
With respect to petitioner’s argument that he has served time in excess of the 
guideline range ( ~ 9  NYCRR 800 1.3), the guidelines “are intended only as a guide, and are 
not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each individual 
case” (see 9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]; Matter of Tdia L h ~ c  u l  ~ C L L  l’uih L)ii,isiuii of Parole, 
290 AD2d 907, 908 [3rd Dept., 20021). Thii?, the Coiirt finds that th is dries not sewc 3% 3 
basis to overturn the Board’s decision. 
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a re- 
sentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple 
punishments are conclusory and without merit (see iblaller 01 Bockeno v New k’ork Stare 
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive 
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DeDartrnent Board of Appeals Unit, 28 1 AD2d 672 [3'd Dept., 200 11; Mdtte~ o f  Fvaw v 
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). Moreover, it is well settled 
that the Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was 
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set this c7q the minimum term 
of petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter 
of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd Dept., 20061 lv denied NY2d - 
[January 16,20071). 
The record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision was predetermined 
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent 
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument (see Matter of 
Lue-Shing v Pataki, 30 1 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New 
York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293 
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter ofLittle v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051, 
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061). 
With respect to petitioner's argument that the Appeals Unit failed to icwe a timely 
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying 
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her 
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seek judicial 
review of the underlying determination (see 9 NYCRR 5 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York 
State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628 [3rd Dept, 20001, Iv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex 
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rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3rd Dept., 20001). 
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to 
due process, the Court observes that it has been repeatedly held that a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest does not arise under Executive Law 6 2594, since it does not create 
an entitlement to, or legitimate expectation of release (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169 [2nd 
Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40 [2nd Cir., 200 13, at p. 44; Paunetto v Hammock (5 16 
F Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 19811; Washington v White, 805 F Supp 191 [SDNY, 
19921). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
With respect to petitioner's equal protection argument, the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution forbids States from denying to any person within their jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws, but does not prevent the States from making reasonable 
classifications among persons (Western & S.L.I. Co. v Bd. of Equalization, 45 1 US 648'68 
L Ed 2d 5 14, 523 10 1 S Ct 2070 [ 198 13). Where the action under review does not involve 
a suspect class or fundamental right, it is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny, but rather is 
examined using the rational basis standard to determine if the action violated the equal 
protection clause (see, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307,49 L Ed 2d 
520,524,96 S Ct 2562 and Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242,250). In this instance there is 
simply no evidence of either selective or disparate treatment or that the respondent's 
determination was motivated by impermissible considerations (see Giordano v City of New 
York, 274 F3d 740, 751 [2nd Cir., 20011). 
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The Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months) 
is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (see, Matter of Tatta v State 
ofNew York, Division ofParde, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, Iv denied 98 NY2d 604). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and finds them to be without 
merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are 
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this 
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this 
DecisiordOrder with notice of entry. 
A 
ENTER 
Dated: March'3C ,2007 
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George B. Ceresia, Jr. 
Order To Show Cause dated November 20,2006, Petition, Supporting 
Papers and Exhibits 
Respondent's Answer dated January 11,2007, Supporting Papers and 
Exhibits 
Affirmation of Bridget E. Holohan, Esq., dated January 1 1, 2007 
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